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Introduction
Contemporary neuroscience unites three scientific traditions: one in anatomy that goes back
to the Greeks (functional localization), one in chemistry that arose in the twentieth-century
(neurotransmitters), and one in physics that arose in the nineteenth-century (electrical signals)
(Clarke and Jacyna, 1987; Finger, 1994; Valenstein, 2005; McComas, 2011). Emil du Bois-Reymond
is the father of the last. He’s not quite Victor Frankenstein, but he’s close.
When du Bois-Reymond began his investigations neurophysiologists were divided. Some
followed the physician Luigi Galvani (1737–1798) in ascribing the action of nerves and muscles to
vital powers of “animal electricity.” Others sided with the physicist Alessandro Volta (1745–1827)
in believing that the muscular contractions that Galvani observed were an artifact of electricity
generated by the contact of metal with organic tissue (Pera, 1992; Piccolino, 1998; Piccolino and
Bresadola, 2013). Recognizing value in both positions, du Bois-Reymond solved the problem of
contact electricity, set forth a program of biological reduction, and demonstrated the electrical
nature of nerve signals. In a little less than two years—from March, 1841 to January, 1843—he
created the discipline of electrophysiology.
That’s the short version of du Bois-Reymond’s innovation. We know that it’s true because
winners write history—at least, that’s what we’ve been told. In the case of du Bois-Reymond,
however, the truth is closer to this: those who write history win. Does this fact change his story?
Consider the evidence.
Theory
Emil du Bois-Reymond was born in Berlin on 7 November 1818 to family of Huguenot origins
(Finkelstein, 2013). His mother’s forebears were merchants, scholars, and artists that had lived
in Berlin for generations; his father was a poor, self-taught immigrant from the Swiss canton of
Neuchâtel. Du Bois-Reymond grew up speaking French, reading the philosophes, and chafing at
the confines of his father’s Calvinism. His first impulse on entering university was to embrace
Romanticism, but it didn’t take long for him to ditch Naturphilosophie in favor of a mechanical
view of the world. Clues to his conversion can be found in his reading: Lucretius in the summer of
1838, French physics shortly thereafter, and the Cours de philosophie positive of Auguste Comte—
most likely—in 1842. The result, as he reported to a friend, regarded science from a perspective that
was nearly Cartesian:
I have sworn to uphold the truth that no forces operate in the organism other than those common
to physics and chemistry; that, where these do not suffice in explanation by means of the mathematico-
physical method, one must either look at a specific case of the force in question, or one must assume
new forces, which, of the same order as the physico-chemical inherent in matter, always reduce to only
attractive and repulsive components (du Bois-Reymond, 1918, p. 108).
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It should be noted that du Bois-Reymond’s materialism was
purely methodological. As he saw it, force and matter served
as terms of convenience, and anyone who confused them
with real entities was committing the same error as primitive
ancestors who “once peopled bush and fountain, rock, air, and
sea with creatures of their imagination” (du Bois-Reymond,
1848–1884, pp. xl–xli). Anthropomorphic fantasies had no place
in science.
With respect to biology du Bois-Reymond’s outlook translated
into a repudiation of vitalism. To be sure, he was not the
first German to adopt this position—the Romantic psychiatrist
Johann Christian Reil (1759–1813) had done so in 1796, as
had the psychologist Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) in 1842—
but du Bois-Reymond was the first to effect a lasting change
in the outlook of his colleagues. It was one thing for
theoreticians like Reil and Lotze to espouse a particular
view of nature, and it was altogether another for a scientist
like du Bois-Reymond. This is why his words carried so
much weight. Looking back at the development of his
discipline over the course of the nineteenth-century, the
Belgian physiologist Paul Heger (1846–1925) deemed du
Bois-Reymond’s pronouncement “an act of courage whose
worth is difficult to appreciate today” (Heger, 1896–1897, p.
565).
In this regard the three elements of du Bois-Reymond’s
positivism (biological reduction, functional analysis, and
methodological materialism) constitute a shift in the paradigm
of neuroscience. Very few neuroscientists still endorse the crude
materialism that Carl Vogt (1817–1895), Jacob Moleschott
(1822–1893), and Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899) popularized in
their polemics against religion in the 1850s (Gregory, 1977).
By contrast, most share du Bois-Reymond’s opinion that vital
powers do not operate in biology, that explanations of the
nervous system require accounts of the chemical and physical
processes that drive it, and that certain problems, like the
ultimate essence of matter, consciousness, and free will, lie
beyond the understanding of science.
Practice
Perhaps the greatest of du Bois-Reymond’s innovations was
an experimental design that solved three problems that vexed
the study of animal electricity. First, du Bois-Reymond devised
neutral means of coupling instruments to tissue, most notably
“non-polarizable” electrodes formed from an amalgam of
zinc, zinc sulfate, and modeling clay. Second, he invented
devices like the “magneo-electrometer” (AC generator) and
the “rheocord” (potentiometer) that delivered graded shocks
to his preparations. Last, he constructed a galvanometer
sensitive enough to record the results of his protocols. These
breakthroughs allowed him to detect action currents in frog
muscles in 1843; 4 years later the addition of a Wheatstone
bridge circuit to his set-up let him to demonstrate the same
electrical signals in human subjects (see Figure 1) (Finkelstein,
2013).
Du Bois-Reymond’s most famous experiment proceeded as
follows. He attached the leads of his galvanometer to platinum
FIGURE 1 | Du Bois-Reymond’s demonstration of voluntary tetanic
current. The arrows indicate the flow of current through the body. The
galvanometer detecting the signal rests on a separate shelf to avoid
disturbance. Reprinted from du Bois-Reymond (1848–1884), Volume 2, part 2,
plate V, Figure 147.
plates resting in “conducting vessels” filled with saline. After
immersing his fingers in the electrolyte, he waited for the
galvanometer needle to come to rest. All of a sudden, he tensed
one of his arms. The needle jumped. Observers in Berlin, Paris,
and London were astonished by his exhibition; indeed the
performance, which was simple and striking, made his name as
much as any of his scholarly publications. The point was not
lost on du Bois-Reymond, who went on to devise a panoply
of demonstration aids like “the twitch telegraph,” “the frog
alarm,” “the frog pistol,” “the mirror multiplier,” and “the feather
myograph,” many of which still feature in the collections of
science museums today.
The significance of du Bois-Reymond’s instruments escaped
his French and English colleagues at first, but within a generation
even du Bois-Reymond’s skeptics adopted his methods. In fact,
it wouldn’t be that much of a stretch to describe the history
of neuroscience in the image of du Bois-Reymond: a march of
technological progress from the galvanometer to the optogenetic
sensor, all originating in table-top experiments that he carried out
with apparatus he built himself.
Du Bois-Reymond’s instrumental methods embodied a
positivist commitment to measurement that permanently
changed the practice of science (Kuhn, 1961, p. 190). Lord
Kelvin expressed his attitude perfectly: “I often say that when
you can measure what you are speaking about, and express
it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you
cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers,
your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind: it
may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in
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your thoughts advanced to the stage of science” (Thompson,
1889, p. 73). It might be argued that our knowledge of the
brain remains meager and unsatisfactory, that there is still
no consensus about what to measure, at what scale, and
over what span of time. All the same, Alan Lloyd Hodgkin
and Andrew Huxley’s mathematical model of neuron action
potentials endures as one of the great achievements of twentieth-
century physiology. Had du Bois-Reymond been alive to hear
the news of their Nobel Prize, he would have endorsed it
implicitly.
Communication
None of du Bois-Reymond’s innovations would have had quite
the same effect if he hadn’t advertised them to colleagues,
students, and the public. Fortunately, he possessed an exceptional
talent at communication. He helped found the Berlin Society of
Physics and the Berlin Society of Anthropology, organizations
that served as sounding boards for his discoveries; he worked
as permanent secretary of the Prussian Academy of Sciences,
rector of the University of Berlin, and dean of the medical
school, positions that required him to deliver formal addresses;
and he edited the leading German journal of physiology, a
post that helped him shape the discipline. He also directed
Prussia’s first institute of physiology, instructed medical students
in animal electricity, and taught Berlin’s most popular class.
Finally, he conducted demonstrations in Berlin, Paris, and
London, spoke to audiences throughout Germany and the
Netherlands, and reprinted his speeches in the Deutsche
Rundschau, the Revue scientifique, Nature, and the Popular
Science Monthly.
Like all great performers du Bois-Reymond thought hard
about his craft. He compared professors who spoke poorly
to eccentrics who wandered about in their dressing-gowns
(du Bois-Reymond, 1912, p. 492). Remarking on one public
session at the Academy of Sciences, he told his wife, “The
only decent address was mine, of course. . . profound, allusive,
brief, masterfully arranged. Caviar for the audience” (du Bois-
Reymond, 1882). He used the same idiom to describe the
lectures of his tour of the Rhineland: “Apparently no one
is aware that you can present a scientific discourse with a
garnish of poetic reflections and numerical figures, like a
filet with mixed pickles and olives. In Cologne they insisted
that I had read from a manuscript” (du Bois-Reymond,
1877).
Du Bois-Reymond’s attention to rhetoric was deliberate. Early
in his career he realized that “popularizers of science persist in the
public mind as memorial stones of human progress long after the
waves of oblivion have surged over the originators of the soundest
research” (du Bois-Reymond, 1912, p. 354). He never abandoned
his investigations of animal electricity, but he alsomade certain to
address his audience. “The time of poetic production in European
nations appears to have passed,” he wrote to his fiancée in 1853,
“and talent, which might otherwise have achieved something
there, throws itself into oratory and journalism, and later dabbles
in politics” (du Bois-Reymond, 1853). He was somewhat blunter
about the change two decades later. “Today Goethe would be
holding forth at the Reichstag” (du Bois-Reymond, 1912, p.
607).
Du Bois-Reymond’s mention of Goethe alluded to his essay
“The Epochs of Thought.” In this short work, Goethe divided
history into four ages: Poetry, Theology, Philosophy, and Prose,
the last of which he judged a disaster (Goethe, 1817). Du
Bois-Reymond didn’t entirely share Goethe’s pessimism, perhaps
because he equated the prosaic age with science, and perhaps
because he felt more comfortable at the lectern. Whatever
the reason, du Bois-Reymond approached writing with a self-
awareness that verged on irony. He was acutely aware of his
place in the history of science, and his accounts of it draw from
the language of scripture and legend. In a literal sense, du Bois-
Reymond not only shifted the paradigm of neuroscience, he also
set it.
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